Quote:
Originally Posted by Pliny
Do you believe pedophilia is a sin?
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Quote:
Originally Posted by Pliny
Apparently you seem to believe that the Bible must specifically state that women should not wear pants.
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Actually, I don't. But you believe that absence is proof, which it isn't. The history and culture of ancient Israel shows time and again that the difference between the sexes was in color, length and style.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Pliny
You say I have no Bible, culture or history to "back up my claim". That is patently false.
I have given scripture multiple times. YOU just ignore it.
The Bible, as history, demonstrates that only godly men wore pants.
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You have nothing but Priests wearing underwear and 3 Jewish dudes in captivity wearing leggings. You ignore culture and history because it doesn't fit your narrative.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Pliny
The reason why the Bible does not show a godly woman wearing pants is simply because they didn't.
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Really? You know this as a fact? You were there with Moses and throughout the OT into Jesus' times? Gimme a break.
"""There are three clauses in this passage.
(1) A man’s item shall not be on a woman;
(2) and a man shall not wear a woman’s garment;
(3) whoever does such a thing is an abhorrence unto Adonai.
Note the lack of parallel structure in the first two clauses. We might have expected the verse to say, “(1′) A man may not wear women’s clothes; (2′) and a woman may not wear men’s clothes.” It is no violation of Biblical Hebrew style to repeat the same words in a single sentence, so it is peculiar that we do not have matching phrases. The words “man’s” and “men” come first in both clauses, and in order to allow that, the first clause is passive while the second is active. Moreover, the first clause talks of kli gever “item” or “appurtenance” while the second clause uses the word simlat “dress” or “garment.” It seems that the verse speaks of two differing but related rules.
Nonetheless, some of our sages read these two clauses as if they were the statement of two identical rules, one applying to men, one applying to women. That is, they read it as if it says, “a man or a woman shall not wear the items of the other gender.” But most sages treat the two verses as distinct in intent.
One of the most unusual interpretations is that of the early Aramaic source referred to as Pseudo-Yonatan, a translation of the Hebrew Bible that renders kli gever, “a man’s items” as tsitsit (tallit or prayer shawl) and tefillin (phylacteries or prayer amulets worn by traditionally observant Jews). Since these items are required by Halakha (Jewish law) for men but not for women, they are quintessential “men’s items” and thus are the subject of this law, suggests Pseudo-Yonatan.
A debate has been raging for the past two-thousand years over whether women may wear tallit and tefillin, and if so, which berakha (blessing) they say when putting them on. In the course of that debate the minority who forbid women from wearing tallit and tefillin do not cite this interpretation or this verse as proof of their position. Moreover, none of the mainstream halakhic (legal) interpretations of this verse follow the midrash of Pseudo-Yonatan. Thus, this interpretation, while interesting, has no legal weight.
In another attempt to identify the quintessential “men’s items,” Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob, quoted in the Talmud (edited c. 800 C.E.), says, “What is the proof that a woman may not go forth with weapons to war?” He then cites our verse, which he reads this way: “A warrior’s gear may not be put on a woman” (B. Naz. 59a). He reads kli gever as the homograph kli gibbor, meaning a “warrior’s gear.”
This same understanding is followed by Midrash Mishlei (Proverbs) which contends that the Biblical character Yael in the Book of Judges kills General Sisera with a tent pin instead of a sword in order to comply with this law. It would have been “unlady-like” for her to use a sword — worse, a violation of the law — because a sword is a man’s tool and so the righteous woman of valor finds an alternate weapon.
While this interpretation does not prevail in later halakhic discussion, it does appear, and so it must be regarded as a viable albeit minority view as to the intent of the first clause. This interpretation has even been cited in the debate over exemption for women from military conscription in modern Israel.
A common understanding of our verse in exegetical and halakhic literature is stated by Rashi, one of the most highly-regarded Talmudists and Biblical commentators of all time (c. 1040-1105 C.E.): “Kli gever, a man’s item should not be on a woman: That she should not appear as a man so she can go out among men, for this is only for the purpose of adultery.”
Likewise, Rashi says, “Simlat Isha, a man shall not wear a women’s garment: So he can go and be among the women.”
Rashi explains the moral force of this: “To`eva, abhorrence: The Torah forbids only garments that may lead to to`eva, abhorrence.” This comment appears in Rashi‘s Torah commentary, so it is not clear whether Rashi is defining the reason for the law or, alternatively, its scope.
Only a few sources spell out what is meant by “women’s clothing” and “men’s clothing.” Women normally wear colorful clothes; men wear white. Most sources leave the particulars undefined, because they realized that while gender distinction in dress is almost universal, the particulars are a matter of local fashion trends. As the Tur (c. 1300 C.E.), the predecessor code of the Shulhan Arukh, puts it: “A woman should not dress in clothes specifically for men lefi minhag hamaqom according to the local fashion” (YD 182).
The intent of the law, in this view, is to prevent men and women from associating with what would normally be a single-sex group of the other gender under false pretenses for purposes of, or in circumstances that are liable to lead to, heterosexual adultery. Rashi seems to limit the prohibition to this case. Thus men and women cross-dressing in other circumstances might not be prohibited, at least if it can be assured that the “abhorrence” will not result."""