Quote:
Originally Posted by Evang.Benincasa
Bro, I already dealt with this. I pointed out why the use of geber.
So we are going on probably? That means it is likely to be what they think? It is like guessing? Let's see, Gill is using a Rabbi? Would you like me to use some Rabbis of the Talmud? Would you accept what they have to say? I personally wouldn't but if you want to use Rambam I could bring up others who will agree with me. Deuteronomy 22:5 is using words to describe masculinity. Geber actually means strong man. You know, one who has a 30 inch neck size? |
http://www.beki.org/dvartorah/crossdressing/
"In another attempt to identify the quintessential “men’s items,” Rabbi Eliezer ben Jacob, quoted in the Talmud (edited c. 800 C.E.), says, “What is the proof that a woman may not go forth with weapons to war?” He then cites our verse, which he reads this way: “A warrior’s gear may not be put on a woman” (B. Naz. 59a). He reads kli gever as the homograph kli gibbor, meaning a “warrior’s gear.”
This same understanding is followed by Midrash Mishlei (Proverbs) which contends that the Biblical character Yael in the Book of Judges kills General Sisera with a tent pin instead of a sword in order to comply with this law. It would have been “unlady-like” for her to use a sword — worse, a violation of the law — because a sword is a man’s tool and so the righteous woman of valor finds an alternate weapon.
While this interpretation does not prevail in later halakhic discussion, it does appear, and so it must be regarded as a viable albeit minority view as to the intent of the first clause. This interpretation has even been cited in the debate over exemption for women from military conscription in modern Israel.
A common understanding of our verse in exegetical and halakhic literature is stated by Rashi, one of the most highly-regarded Talmudists and Biblical commentators of all time (c. 1040-1105 C.E.): “Kli gever, a man’s item should not be on a woman: That she should not appear as a man so she can go out among men, for this is only for the purpose of adultery.”
Likewise, Rashi says, “Simlat Isha, a man shall not wear a women’s garment: So he can go and be among the women.”
Rashi explains the moral force of this: “To`eva, abhorrence: The Torah forbids only garments that may lead to to`eva, abhorrence.” This comment appears in Rashi‘s Torah commentary, so it is not clear whether Rashi is defining the reason for the law or, alternatively, its scope.
Only a few sources spell out what is meant by “women’s clothing” and “men’s clothing.” Women normally wear colorful clothes; men wear white. Most sources leave the particulars undefined, because they realized that while gender distinction in dress is almost universal, the particulars are a matter of local fashion trends. As the Tur (c. 1300 C.E.), the predecessor code of the Shulhan Arukh, puts it: “A woman should not dress in clothes specifically for men lefi minhag hamaqom according to the local fashion” (YD 182).
The intent of the law, in this view, is to prevent men and women from associating with what would normally be a single-sex group of the other gender under false pretenses for purposes of, or in circumstances that are liable to lead to, heterosexual adultery. Rashi seems to limit the prohibition to this case. Thus men and women cross-dressing in other circumstances might not be prohibited, at least if it can be assured that the “abhorrence” will not result.
This is the analysis followed by the Shulhan Arukh, the 16th century law code that has become a standard law text for most of the traditionally observant Jewish people. In its discussion of the laws of the festival of Purim (OH 696:8), the Code says men and women may cross dress on Purim because it is for the purpose of gaity (simha), not for adultery. Given the context, there is no danger that such cross-dressing will lead to heterosexual adultery.
The danger of “cross-dressing,” according to the analysis followed here by Rashi and the Shulhan Arukh, is that it might allow men to enter women’s groups and women to enter men’s groups. In societies in which gender segregation was widely observed, this subterfuge was seen as a real danger. This was even before the production of “Yentl.”
It is stated this way in Sefer HaHinukh: “The root of this mitzva (commandment) is to keep us from sexual sin…and there is no doubt that if men and women’s clothing were the same, they would mix and the earth would be filled with impropriety” ( 564).
Today the concern would be that men or women would sneak into the other gender’s locker rooms or bath rooms. Given that men and women in our society mix freely in other settings, it is hard to see how heterosexual adultery is a particular danger of what is called “cross dressing.”
Some commentators have noted, however, that this understanding as explained by Rashi and the Shulhan Arukh does not seem to be based on the language of the verse. If the Torah had wanted to prohibit men from going out among women in women’s dress it could have said that. This context of social mixing of men and women is imposed on the verse.
A second interpretation of the verse has gained the widest acceptance among the sages as reflected in mainstream legal codes. The Shulhan Arukh (Yore De`a) says that the prohibition of a man wearing simlat isha “women’s dress” or “women’s fashion” refers to wearing a women’s hairstyle, which, depending on local custom, means specifically to shave one’s underarm or pubic hair. Men may not shave their armpits and genital regions as women do unless it is customary locally for men to do that. Men may however shave arm and leg hair in any case.
Other commentators likewise relate the simlat isha clause only to removing underarm and pubic hair."
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